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Resource Certification (RPKI)

Alex Band – Product Manager RIPE 64, Ljubljana



RIPE 63: Members Voted on Certification

- The RIPE NCC will continue working on RPKI
 - Offer resource certificates on an opt-in basis
 - Offer a platform for BGP Origin Validation
- A close vote
- A clear message

Proceed with caution!



Concerns That Were Raised

1. Operator Autonomy

 RIR could be forced to tamper with the certificate tree (court order)

2.Security

- The system could get compromised (hack, error, etc.)

3.Resilience

- The system could suffer from a failure
- Data cannot be maintained or retrieved (affecting BGP)



Summary

- Members have expressed their support for:
 - A service that offers validatable proof of holdership
 - The possibility to perform BGP Origin Validation
 - Prevent (unintentional) hijacks
 - Have a stepping stone to BGPSEC (Path Validation)
- Those advantages must outweigh potential risks:
 - Diminished operator control of BGP routing
 - An RPKI failure results in unreachable networks



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
Quick Recap



Digital Resource Certificates

- Resource Certification is a free, opt-in service
 - -Your choice to request a certificate
 - Linked to registration
 - -Renewed every 12 months
- Enhancement to our Registry
 - Offers validatable proof of holdership

Certificate Authority (CA) Structure





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Using RPKI for BGP Origin Validation



Management: Your Choice

- Open Source Software to run a member CA
 - -Use the RIPE NCC as parent CA (trust anchor)
 - Generate and publish Certificate yourself

- RIPE NCC Hosted Platform
 - All processes are secured and automated
 - One click set-up of Resource Certificate
 - -WebUI to manage ROAs in LIR Portal



Certification to Secure Internet Routing

 Members can use their resource certificate to make statements about their BGP Routing

> Route Origin Authorisation (ROA): *"I authorise this Autonomous System to originate these IP prefixes"*




Route Origin Authorisations

- Only the registered holder of a Internet number resource can create a valid ROA
- A ROA affects the RPKI validity of a BGP route:
 VALID: ROA found, authorised announcement
 - INVALID: ROA found, unauthorised announcement
 - UNKNOWN: No ROA found (resource not yet signed)



Resource Certification Adoption



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The Relying Party – That's YOU!

- Anyone can base any routing decision on the RPKI data set
- Three variables: VALID, INVALID, UNKNOWN
 - -Treat them as you wish
 - Override specific parts locally

The decision making power is in your hands!



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Operator Autonomy



Enhance Relying Party Autonomy

- The relying party is in the driver's seat:
 - You can choose to rely on any Trust Anchor
 - Data set is the sum of all configured Trust Anchors

- RIPE NCC RPKI Validator has additional controls:
 - You can ignore or override any RPKI data point:
 - -White List (Apply RPKI status 'Valid')
 - Ignore Filter (Apply RPKI status 'Unknown')



Whitelist

Add entry

Drigin	Prefix	Maximum prefix length	
ASN (required)	IPv4 or IPv6 prefix (required)	Number (optional)	Add

Current entries

Show 10 \$ entries										
Origin		Prefix			Maximu	m Prefix Length	Å	Validates	Invalidates	
2121		193.0.24.0	0/21		21			1 prefix(es)	0 prefix(es)	delete
First	First Previous 1 Next Last								ng 1 to 1 of 1 entries	
						ASN	Prefi	x		
	Copyright ©2009-2012					2121	193.0).24.0/21		



Ignore Filters

By adding a filter the validator will ignore any RPKI prefixes that overlap with the filter's prefix.

Add filter

refix				
Pv4 or IPv6 prefix (required)	Add			

Current filters

Show 10) 🛊 entries			Search:
Prefix A Filtere		Filtered ROA prefixes		
193.0.0.	0/19		1 prefix(es)	delete
First	Details			Showing 1 to 1 of 1 entries
	ASN	Prefix	Maximum Length	
	2121	193.0.24.0/21	21	Centre RIPE NCC. All rights restricted. Version 2.0.3

Using The Overrides Practically

- If a ROA is not trusted:
 - it can be ignored or white listed in the RPKI Validator
 - overrides can be applied directly on the router
- In a fully deployed RPKI world, this requires >8000 RIPE NCC members to take action

That doesn't scale




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Proposal: Using Independent Monitors

- External, independent monitors can publish a list of address space that is disputed or untrusted
- NOGs, ISOC, EFF?
- RPKI Validator can import these lists and feed the ignore filter
 - Automatically ignore or send alert





External filters

List of external monitor	' 5		
	•		
External monitor 1	delete		
Additional monitor			
https://			
Update			

Current filters

Show 10 I entries		Search:
Prefix	Filtered ROA prefixes	
10.0.0/8	6 prefix(es)	delete

Considerations

- Potential monitors need to have broad support
 - Open process, transparent
 - Impartial, community driven
 - Outside RIPE NCC jurisdiction
- Ignore only if certain amount of monitors agree
- Possible attack vector on monitors
- No IETF Standards cover this
 - Data format to be determined



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Security, Resilience, Service Expansion



- Enhance LIR Portal two-factor authentication
 - Solution that works for >8000 members in 72 countries
 - Looking at mobile phones (SMS)

- Independent audits of code and CA operation
 - Get Certificate Authority Accreditation?



Enhance Resilience

- Make all elements of the system more resistant to failure and attack:
 - -Hosted Certificate and ROA management

- LIR Portal

- Non-hosted Parent Certificate system
 - -up/down
- Data retrieval
 - RIPE NCC ROA Repository



Expand Eligible Address Space

- Incrementally add:
 - Certification access for Direct Assignment Users
 - Certification access for PI End Users
 - Direct access, or
 - Grant access to sponsoring LIR
 - Certify 'Minority' address space
 - Get child certificate from 'Majority' RIR
 - Legacy space



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The Roadmap



The Roadmap

- Q1/Q2: Test system, better Validator, better UI
- Q2/Q3: Strengthen Operator Autonomy
 - Build monitoring infrastructure prototype
- Q3/Q4: Strengthen Security
 - -Authentication, periodic auditing
- Q4/Q1: Strengthen Resilience
 - Service and data set distribution
- Gradual: Expand eligible address space



Information and Announcements

http://ripe.net/certification #RPKI

Questions?

alexb@ripe.net@alexander_band



